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'Introductory note 
This paper contains the results of the research work conducted by the 
Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit concerning the linkages of transnational corporations 
(TNCs) with the tin industry in Bolivia, .Part I reviews selected aspects 
of the international tin industry and .particularly , the bargaining capacity 
of TNCs and host governments of developing countries in the successive 
stages of mining, smelting and marketing of tin. In Part II the new 
bargaining situation of Bolivia after the nationalization of large mines 
in 1952 is analysed, especially, with regard to ,the continuing linkages 
with TNCs in.smelting and marketing. 
Throughout the paper, an attempt has been made to underline important 
aspects of the common research framework of the Interregional CEPAL/ECA/ESCAP 
Project - , such as the increasing, sovereignty of developing producer 
countries over their natural resources through direct government participation 
in tin mining and smelting, the continuing control of main international 
ti,n markets by developed consumer countries, large TNCs and traders and 
finally, related problems and solutions.encountered by Bolivian public 
enterprises in increasing the vertical integration of the industry and 
its retained value in,favour of the country's economic and social progress. 
For various reasons., however—particularly lack of more detailed 
information and shortage. of.resources in the Unit—it, has not been possible 
to analise the new aspects of the Bolivian bargaining capacity and resulting 
distribution of gains in a more coherent and systematic way, as would have 
been desirable according to the abotfe-mentioned common research framework. 
J/ See B. Widyono, Primary 
Distribution of Gains, Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit, Working Paper N°5, August, 
1977, and the new version prepared by the Joint ESCAP/CTC Unit in 
September 1978. /An additional 
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An additional evaluation of the current achievements and problems 
encountered by the Bolivian tin industry, particularly in smelting and 
marketing expansion, will be'submitted later, taking advantage of the 
co-operation kindly supplied by Bolivian Government authoritie&.' 
This paper is based on a study by Unit's consultant Mr, Roberto Arce, 
on an unpublished Report prepared on CEPAL. request by the Economist ' 
Intelligence Unit and finally, on a synthetic study by B.Widyono, at that 
time staff member of the Joint CEPAL/Clt; Unit and presently Chief of the 
1/ .... 
Joint ESCAP/CTC Unit - . Support in the form df valuable comments and new 
information has been kindly given by the CEPAL "Divisions !of Natural Resources 
and Industrial Development (particularly'Messrs, R. San¿-GuerreroV S.' Moya 
and L. Willmore) and the Cihief of' the Unit A. Ntfnez del Prado. Any errors 
and omissions in this paper, however,' are the responsibility of the 
Regional Adviser of the Unit, J. Knakai, who' was in charge of its editing. 
Finally, while this'paper was prepared solely for use by the 
Interregional Expert Group Meeting on'Bargaining Capacity and Distribution 
of Gains in Export-Oriented Primary Commodities"!Bangkok, 8-13 October 1979), 
critical comments and complementary"information would be particularly 
welcomed from government officials, experts and academic ¿ircles in Bblivia 
and other Latin American countries in'order to assist in the preparation, 
of a definitive CEPAL study for tine forthcoming Interregional Seminar of 
Government Representatives to be held' next year in New York. 
\j Roberto Arce, Influencia de las empresas transnacionales en la minería 
del estaño: El caso de Bolivia, Working Paper N° 4, Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit, 
July 1977; The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd. EIU, Report, prepared 
for United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, A Selective 
Assessment, of tĥ ;.forid;Tin Market,-. London, January 1977 and 
B. Widyono, Case Study Ng T: The.Tin Industry in Bolivia. Joint CEPAL/CTC 
Unit, -Working Páper.N? 6, August "1977.; 
Part I 
SELECTED' ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL- TIN INDUSTRY AND THE ROLE OF BOLIVIA 
Tin mines of commercial value are confined to a few areas in the 
world: South-East Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the People's Republic 
of China, Burma), the Bolivian Andes, some regions of Africa (Nigeria, 
Zaire), Australia and, recently, Rondonia in Brazil. 
Tin, compared with other basic metals, has a low level of production 
and a high price. In 1973, 64 times more aluminium was consumed worldly, 
41 times more copper, 21 times more zinc and 18 times more lead. In 
average terms, one ton of this metal costs 3, 6, 9 and 12 times more than 
one ton of copper, zinc, aluminium and lead, respectively. 
The rate of growth of tin consumption and production is lower than 
that of some other metals« In the past 18 years the comparative 
cumulative annual percentage growth has been: tin 1.7°/0j ,lead 3.5% and 
c apper 4. ^ 
The main reason for the relatively slow growth of" tin consumption 
is the scarcity of tin mines and, therefore,-thè high value of this metal, 
which has caused the use of tin in mahufácturing tb be reduced to a 
minimum ànd its replacement' by other products (aluminium, chromium and 
plastics). ' 
Up to the 1870s, the main producing' country in the wtirld since the 
times of the Roman Empire was England, with its now depleted tin mines in 
Cornwall. From 1890 onwards, South-East Asia* particularly Malaysia ancf 
Indonesia, were the foremost producers of this metal. Bolivia only started 
to acquire importance as a tin producer early in this century. 
/In South-East 
In South-East Asia, most of the ,.tin. production Is obtained from-
alluvial tin which is mainly exploited by means of modern dredges or 
hydraulic methods (monitors" for extraction and lanchutes for concentration 
of tin). In Bolivia, in contrast, the tin mines are found in inhospitable 
regions of Andes Range, at a height of over 3,000 metres. Ciostly tunnels 
must be drilled for the extraction of tin. For example, in the Siglo XX 
mine there are over 200 kilometers of underground passages and the ore is 
extracted by means of electric engines. Moreover, tin obtained from veins 
contain a large quantity of impurities. The process of concentration is 
much more expensive than that of alluvial tin, with high investment in 
concentration plants. Despite technological progress, for every ton of 
tin concentrates produced nearly another ton is lost in the form of residue 
(colas) left in the concentration plants ~ . For these reasons, Bolivia 
is a country of high production costs, compared with those exploiting 
alluvial tin. 
b) ; Tin consumption, ;. • . . ..., . .. 
Tin plate and solders are the most important applications for tin 
metal, accounting for 47% and 23°/o respectively ¡pf.all tip. consumed in 
developed- countries. -The slow increase of tin. consumption may be partly 
explained by the f^ct-that „tin-free steel, aluminium and plastic have 
replaced in a. high degree tin• plate in the production,.of cans. Secondly, 
improvements in the technology of tin plate production as a result of heavy 
R & D expenditures have reduced-.the; amount of tin contained in tin plate. 
The major tin can corporations-:have not integrated themselves backward like 
the aluminium and copper companies. Thus, whereas the aluminium companies 
\J Those will be since 1960s processed in a new smelter fbr the treatment 
of low grade tin (see part II, 3. below). 
'% /are continously 
are cantiriously advancing the uses of aluminium, the tin can-companies have 
no direct stake in 'the tin'pfoduction, -probSbly rcfldctiag their concern 
. 1/ , 
over the 'Sensitiveness of supplies;— - • • -
Of the other1 end uses, "derrBrid'of t'ini for' soldering' ha!s risen rather 
slowly, whereas the uses of the metal fi'n bronze and brass has declined 
in absolute terms. The fastest rising component of demand for tin is for 
industrial chemicals. But only a'minor poirtioh (less than 10^) of total 
consumption goes to such uses. The above development is reflected in a 
low income elasticity off demand for tin•iW industrialized countries. 
Estimates are between 0.1 to '0,3̂  World demand'for'tin has been'projected 
. , . ... , 2 / to increase by only 1.5% per annum between • 1972/1974 and 1985. "" 
As is the case with most primary commodities, especially minerals- • 
and fuels, the major Consumers of tiYv'are the developed countries whereas ' 
the producers are the developing ones; Tin is in fact ah extreme example 
of this general pattern in that all the major exporters are developing 
countries, concentrated in Southeast Asia and''Bolivia, with other 
2/ Major tiri can producers ranked by capacity are: 1. Ameridah Can (US); 
'2. . Continental. Can (US); 3. Metal Box (UK); 4. . Toyo.Ejeikan (Japan) ; 
5. National Can (US); 6. Campbell's (US); 7. Schmallach (W.Germany); 
6. Thomassen-Origzér-Verblisa (Netherlands); 9. Carnaud (France). 
The last three are subsidiaries of American Can or. Metal Box. Major . 
tinplate producers ranked by production are: 1. U.S.Steel (US); 
2. British Steel (UK); 3. National Steel (US);'4. Bethlehem Steel (US); 
5. Nippon Steel (Japan); 6; Rasselstem. A.G-. (W.Germany); 7* Soc. 
Lorraine de Laminage Continue (France). (Source: Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Report to CEPAL on "A Selective Assessment of the World Tin 
Market", January 1977, unpublished.)- ' , 
2/ IBRD, Price Prospects for Major Primary,Commodities, Report N° 814/77, 
June 1977. , 
/significant,producers 
significant producers located in Africa (Zaire, and Nigeria), Brazil is 
also a potentially important producer. These countries together account 
for only 3% of world consumption. Only Australia and socialist countries 
among the major producers;are major, consumers as well. . The bulk of tin 
metal is consumed by the United States, Western Europe ,and Japan (see 
table 1). yj 
Taking the developing.countries as a whole, their combined production 
of primary tin in 197? was 170,6 thousand tons or .76% of total world 
production as compared :to 15.1, thousand tons, or, 7°/a for the developed 
market economies and 30, 9 thousand ¡tons, or 17% for the centrally planned 
economies. In 1973-1975, consumption of tin metal was distributed as 
follows: developed .countries, 143.8 thousand, tons, or ,68% of. the world 
total, developing.countries, 15.2 thousand tons ..or 7% and centrally planned 
economies, 52 thousand tons, or :24% (see .tables 1 and .2). 
2. Tin mining, ̂and̂ reseryes 
As indicated above, the production of primary tin is concentrated in 
the developing countries of Asia, Latin America end Africa. In the period 
since the beginning of 1950s until the "second half of 1970s the participation 
of Asia in world primary tin production decreased from 58% to 52% and that 
of Africa from 13% to 6%. Asia nonetheless retained its position as the 
' .it " •, 
main producing region. . Durign the same three decades Australia increased 
its share from • 1% to 4% and the socialist countries (especially Soviet Union 
and People's Republic of China) more than doubled their share (from 7% to 
17%). Latin America recovered during the 1960s and 1970s its production 
losses from 1950s and in 1977 :with a. f8% was the second most important 
tin-producing area (see again table 2). Bolivia accounted, in 1977, 
for 81% and Brazil for 18% of the total Latin American production. 
1/ Reference is always being made to the tables contained in Statistical 
Annex (see p. 38). . 
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As to!,thé distrititjtiòn of ;:world reserves of'-:tin Indonesia accounts , 
for 24%, People*ë Republic of China- 15% Thailand-.12%, Bolivia . 10% . • . 
Malaysia' 3% and-USSR and Brazil-6% each (see table .3). The difference. , 
in r&nking betwéfeh reserves and present annual. production can be explained 
by différent• ̂ ates of production whichare abox/e the world averaga of ; • 
2.3°/o- in the cases of Malaysia (7. 9°/a) ,. Soviet. Union (4.8%) -, Australia; (3.1%) 
and Bolivia (2.8%). : These-high rates of-.reserve exploitation illustrate 
also the above'stated scarcity of tin ¿.world;, resources:, producer countries 
will see their tin reserves'exhausted in a- pçriodr. of 13 to 36 years unless.. 
. . . 1 / new ones would be-added ' for if uttnre' exploitation. .. 
3. Sovereignty of developing countries miiii nr ii f n i iiirfriBii~i r i i i mi r r 
In the tin industry ownership and control over resources and production 
is increasingly being transferred to the governments of developing countries. 
The nationalization of Bolivia in 1952 ̂  has been accompanied or even preceded 
by similar events iq virtually all other major producer countries. 
. In fact, prior to Bolivia's nationalization in 1952, the important 
tin- mines of China automatically reverted to the government with the 
establishment of. thp^People*s Republic of China in 1949. Furthermore in 
1957, Indonesia nationalized the tin enterprises owned by the Dutch TNC 
Billiton Maat.schappij (now a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell) and established 
1 / ; The'"other--"resources"' total volume is evaluated to be almost three, 
- , times higher than, that of industrial reserves, with outstanding 
cases of Brazil, Zaire, Indonesia and 'Malaysia,, The"' use of :these-
resources obviously depends .on.the cost of their, accessibility and 
thereforeon tin price. 
2/ See: part II,,1., below. . 
/a state 
- 6 -
a state monopoly for tin, P. T, Tirnah, which is-a fully integrated firm and 
markets its refined tin directly to consumer countries or;through the 
London Metal:Exchange. The state monopoly on. ownership of the-tin industry 
has been maintained"although the new government of the. country in .1967 did 
invite three TNCs to explore for tin uncter working .contracts-with: the state 
enterprise. :Even in traditionally private enterprise, oriented countries 
like -Malaysia and Thailand, the governments have recently shown active 
interest in controlling -We tin industry. Malaysia, the major tin producing 
country, gained through the government: owned holding company, PERNAS 
Securities, control of the" world's'largest TNC in. tin - London Tin 
Corporation-LTC. The company dominate many tin companies in Malaysia, 
Thailand and Nigeria, /Finally., Thailand's government nationalized in 
1975 the important offshore concessions owned jointly by Union Carbide 
of the United States and Dutch Billiton Maatschappik. The new government, 
which came to power in Thailand in, October 1976, upheld the nationalization 
but invited Billiton back in to operate the concession on behalf of the 
Offshore Mining Organization owned by the Thai government. 
In Zaire, the government participates in tin mining through" joint 
ownership with Belgian interests. This leavesi Australia as the only major 
producer in which private producers have control over mining production. 
Table 4 indicates that the four largest tin enterprises in the 
world are controlled by governments. In both China and Indonesia, the-
state controls 100% of production. In Bolivia, CQM2B0L, the state enterprise, 
controls 75% of production. Finally, the government of Malaysia'controls 
through its majority owned. (71%) Holding Company PERNAS some 24% of tin 
production in the country and 46% of Nigeria's production. . 
As in other primary commodities, the government's control' "over tin 
resources and their mining should be considered only a first step in 
/the developing 
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the developing country quest for a larger share of the gains derived from 
industry activities. The most important barriers to entry lie in the 
further stages of the process, that is in smelting, marketing and shipping. 
These issues will be discussed in the following sections. 
Six developing countries (Bolivia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, 
Thailand and Zaire) accounted for 84% of world production of tin 
concentrates and almost 70% of the world production of tin metal in the 
1971-1975 period as compared with 91% and 41% respectively in the first 
half of 1950s. (See table 5). 
The increasing proportion of tin smelted in producing countries 
is a reflection of the improving bargaining position of host governments. 
Prior to 1939, the movement of ccncantrotou to the smelters reflected the 
colonial links in the industry. All Nigerian and Bolivian and most 
Indonesian and Zairian (Belgian Congo) concentrates were shipped to 
British and other Western European smelters. Only Malaysia was an exception 
where a smelter was established by British interests quite early. 
This pattern has changed in the last twenty five years. The Government 
of Indonesia (P.T. Timah) established a tin smelter in 1967 with a present 
capacity of 25 000 tons (see table 6). In Nigeria, local pressure forced 
the Consolidated Tin (Patino) corporation to set up a tin smelter in 1961 
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the treatment of low grade tin with a capacity of approximately 10 000 tons. 
Thus, by the 1980s, Bolivia will have a tin smelting capacity capable, of 
processing domestically all of its tin production. Among developing 
countries, Brazil has an important tin smelting industry (partly dominated 
by the Patino group) with total capacity of 16 000 tons, j/ 
These data on tin smelting indicate'that efforts to increase the 
forward linkage effects by host governments have been quite successful, 
although the Patino group still dominates some 26% of the world's smelting 
capacity, followed by the Singapore Banking Group and Royal Dutch Shell's 
Billiton Company (10% and 11% of the worldwide capacity respectively). 
The Patino group of companies is still very important in the tin 
industryespecially in its downstream stages, i.e.smelting, marketing • 
and financing (see diagram l). Consolidations and mergers continue to take 
place in this group. For instance, CANBRUSA mining, was formed by members 
of the management, incorporated in Netherlands Antilles and has recently 
completed-the purchase of over 60% of stock owned by Patino. N. V. which is 
the holding company for the group of companies. An important merger took 
place in 1975, when. Consolidated Tin Smelters, (CTS) established in 1929 to 
concentrate Patino's holdings in tin ..smelters merged with Amalgamated Metal 
Corporation (also established in 1929.) as a holding company for two leading 
metal marketing companies,: the-British Metal Corporation and Henry Gardner 
Company. These two companies in turn continued to operate separately 
until 1972 viien their trading activities were merged into AMC which since 
then became the - principal trading company. Before the AMC-CTS merger, the 
two companies had already been associated for a long time. Patino N. V. , 
owned 76% of CTS and CTS owned 61% of AMC. Nevertheless, AMC was left the 
dominant company after the merger, because it was better known in tin 
marketing. The companies benefited from common services including a jointly 
shared London office and common director. 
\j For further details see pari: II, 3., below, 
/The process 
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The process of "decolonization" in tin smelting is reflected in the 
difficulties experienced by smelters in consumer countries. In Arnhem, 
the Netherlands, the tin sm.elter stopped operations in 1971 as the 
Indonesian smelter came on stream and concentrates stopped arriving. 
The I'i/illiams Harvey smelter owned by the Patino group in the United Kingdom, 
which formerly smelted all of Bolivia's high grade tin, went into voluntary 
liquidation in 1973 and the Hpboken smelter in Belgium, with a capacity of 
18 000 tons is also experiencing difficulties with the supply of concentrates 
and in 1976 only produced 4 000 tons. 
5. Control over the world tin market 
Control over marketing is an important element in the bargaining power 
of governments. The establishment of tin smelters in producing countries, 
described above, will not only increase the value; added, and foreign 
exchange earned from tin activities, but will also provide; a better control 
over »the marketing, of tin, as tin.metal may be sold directly to final ' 
consumers.- -.•:>. . ' . . . ; . . v 
This is not the case with concentrates where individual sales, contracts 
vary greatly according to mineral, by-products, parties involved, fopm of 
shipment chosen, length of contract, etc. Nevertheless smelting contracts 
have certain basic features: First, prices are based on quotations at the 
London Metal Exchange (LME) or New York markets and are adjusted by 
smelting and refining fees. The fees depend on metal content, cost 
escalation clauses and penalties, for impurities. Secondly, the refinery-
will choose a quotation period, normally following discharge at port of 
destination. Thirdly, a provisional payment, 8Q. to 90°/o of estimated, value, 
will be made against shipping documents, .the rest being,paid after finally 
/establishing volume 
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establishing volume and grade. In many cases trading firms act as agents 
or as principals between the producer and smelting companies. 
From the above it is clear that the actual distribution of gains at 
the market level, depends primarily on two factors: one is the process 
of price formation in the international markets and the bargaining power 
of governments in those markets, and the other the negotiations 
regarding the many discount clauses which can increase or reduce actual 
gains, given international prices. It is therefore important to understand 
the working of the international tin markets and the related factors 
determining the world prices of tin. 
There are three principal international markets for tin: the Penang 
Malaysia, the London Metal Exchange and the New York tin market. 
Diagram 2 shows clearly that the principal factors determining market prices 
are the demand of industrialized countries and their stock of tin. Before 
examining in detail the organization and working of international tin 
markets other factors affecting them will be shortly reviewed. 
Factors affecting the tin market: United States and International Tin 
Council reserves »-——-—--p ~ i p"t — ifi iff if"»-t 
Apart from production tin supplies, stocks held in market' economies 
are determined by two additional factors: the General Services 
Administration (GSA) which is the United States Government agency in charge 
of strategic stockpile disposal, and the International Tin Council (ITC) 
stocks. The U. S. sales from their strategic reserves of tin have been a 
powerful force in the market in comparison .with the ITC leverage. 
The events of the war led the United States to establish a strategic 
stockpile of tin and other metals. The fear of again losing the strategic 
tin area of Southeast Asia in the cold war period is demostrated by the 
stated objective of the reserves. This stock, formed mainly in the 
/Diagram 2 
Diagram 2 
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late 1940s and 1950s, was to be of a size sufficient to maintain 
United States* consumption at normal levels during a four year war in 
which all foreign sources of the metal were cut off. Although this 
initial objective was subsequently abandoned, the size of the stock 
continued to exceed total market economies1 annual production qf tin from ; 
1952 to 1973 (from more than two times until the second half of 1960s, 
to 1.2 times in 1973, see table 7). The near absurd size of the stockpile 
was recognized by the United States in the :1960s» Since then their goal 
was to reduce stocks in periods of high prices in the international.. tin 
markets. This resulted in net sales of about 120 000 tons between 1956 
and 1974 which very often had a disruptive effect on tin prices. In fact, 
sales from the United States' stockpile had a much greater influence on 
world prices of tin than the bufferstock operations of the International 
Tin Council, the other important force in.the world tin 
economy. J/ 
The main goal of the International Tin Agreement, of.which the 
International Tin Council (ITC) is the executive .arm,,has been to impart 
greater stability to world tin markets. Both consumer and producer : 
countries are members of the five successive agreements which had been 
in force since 1956. Bufferstock operations and export controls have been 
the two main instruments used by,the ITC in its attempt to reduce price 
fluctuations and contain that) within publicly known floor and ceiling 
levels. However, in relation to the United States stockpile, which was 
always greater than annual world consumption, the authorized size of the 
bufferstock (20 000 tons) has been fairly small, ranging between one and 
two months* consumption over the four tin agreements in force. . In 
1956-1973 period the total ITC bufferstock purchases, aimed at.stabilizing 
or increasing the tin price, reached 60 000 tons as compared with sales of 
j/ See again the excellent paper cited in-table 7 on which the major part of 
this discussion is based. „ „„„ , • • • /150 000 tons 
150 000 tons -by U* S. GSA in the same period which had opposite ' : 
effects on international tin markets than the ITC sales 
(see again table 7). The fifth Tin Agreement, which *has come into, force 
in mid-1977, with the recent ratification by Bolivia, should double the 
ITC stockpile (to 40 000 tons)'through voluntary contributions by corisumer 
countries (during the four previous agreements-, only producer countries 
financed the bufferstock). 
It is not publicly known to what extent the geopolitical sensitivity of 
the concentration of tin resources in' Southeast Asia has contributed to' 
the enormous amounts spent on Research and Development of tin substitutes'by 
the can industry, especially in the United States. Additional^, the 
United States, and other industrialized countries as well, are; trying 
to diminish their dependence on tin imports .by increasing the recovery r 
of secondary tin from scrap. The U.S. production of this type-of tin 
reached 15 600 and 18 200 long tons in 1974 and 1975 which is about 
one third of total tin consumption of that country, 
The overview given above shows that, the international tin market 
continues ,to, be dominated by industrialized Consumer countries, particularly 
through the U. S. strategic stockpile.operations. The international Tin 
Agreement has only marginally reduced, the inestability-of prices and - -
producer incomes. It has endured while other agreements have failed, in 1 
part because it has 3.acked effective power, in the face of the " 
United States strategic stockpile, to make criticali price decisions-which 
otherwise would have intensified producers-consumer conflicts. 2/ The 
predominance of industrialized countries and their TNCs is likewise 
reflected in the organization and working of the three major world tin markets. 
"l/ "" Gee,' j - i i j i e r a l . U n i t e d States Department of the Interior, 
. ;0ureau .of Mines, 1975. . • ' • 
2/ These conclusions were taken from the study of G.W. , Smith,and G. R. Schink 
quoted above which had been confirmed by their simulation exercise of 
the Wharton EFA vtorld tin model. 
' /b) International tin * * - - • i i ii M-r"r—-——"if 
b) International tin markets • 
Sincé most of the world's tin is produced in.Southeast Asia, one . 
would expect that the marketing of tin produced in that region would 
be the basé of the world's tin markets. To a certain extent, this is 
true as the Penang market in Malaysia is the most important market in 
terms of physical volume passing through it. However, as will be seen 
below, even though the London. Metal Exchange (LME) has., as its. physical 
basis the relatively small amount of tin smelted in the United Kingdom 
(10 000 
tons in 1976), its influence reaches far beyond this, partly 
through the existence of hedging operations which increase substantially 
the amount of "paper" tin transactions J/ and partly because of colonial 
tradition. The factors determining the price movements of tin in London 
are the hedging operations of producing, merchandizing, consuming and 
investing or speculative purposes.- The latter,is influenced by . the 
relatively high unit price of tin, in comparison with other metals, and 
the perspectives of world political conflicts and.economic problems, 
particularly inflationary pressures. •' ; 
The developing producer countries are anxious to move de facto the 
marketing centre from London to Penang where part of tin production is 
located. This drive will probably take years to accomplish but at present 
a major achievement is that since the floating the pound sterling in the 
early 1970s, the ITC recognizes the Penang price quoted in Malaysian 
ringgit rather than the british currency, as the basis for its floor and 
ceiling prices. 
J_/ For example, in 1972, the physical basis for LME transactions was the 
tin smelted in the United Kingdom (22 000 tons). The volume of "paper" 
transaction in that year reached 143 765 metric tons official plus 
26 415 metric tons unofficial.("Kerb") transactions. See ITC, 
"The International Implications of United States Disposal of Stockpiled 
Tin", London, 197a *. 
/Although normally 
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Although normally not as important as the liiE in determining tin prices, 
the New,York market is important as thè purchasing point for the world's 
largest consuming country of tin, the United States. The New York market 
is not a separate entity. It refers to the sum of all tin transactions 
undertaken in New York rather than a specific organization or specific 
place of business. New York prices are quoted by papers such as the 
• - ' i 
American Metal Market and the Engineering and Mining Journal on the basis 
una l i | i i I « I» !•• • • • • • I l 1 T T I 1 I I •! a • Il I't ' i ^ . i g n v T n i r . i <iriu r1
of the average of actual physical sales of tin for prompt or forward 
delivery. The New York Commodity Exchange, an organization trading many 
commodities, deals in futures but the quantities involved are smaller than 
the physicial tonnage of the New York market, arid can therefore not be 
compared to the futures market of LME. In the United States, by far the 
greatest part of tin physically sold iè disposed of by brokers or agents 
. j • . ' 
for foreign business houses; only a few cohsumers purchase tin directly 
from the smelters in foreign countries. ' Thus the brokers play an all 
important role in the marketing of tiri. More detailed descriptions of the 
\ADrld*s two most important markets, LME dnd Penarig are given below, 
(i) The London Metal Exchange (LME) J/ 
The LME,'- established- in 1882, has been located in the same premises 
in the City of London ever since. The Metal Market and Exchange Company 
is the proprietor of the Exchange, and its shareholders are the members 
(subscribers) of the LME. 
The committee of suscribers acts as the executive arm of the market, and 
has the following responsibilities: 
j/ Information based on a abdve cited report prepared by,Economist 
Intelligence Unit. •• - . , 
/- Maintenance of 
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- Maintenance ¡of correct discipline "and protocol in thè Ring (the 
Ring is where the official trading of the LME is conducted)j 
- Assessment of daily prices; • 
- Formulation of new contracts; -
- Registration of brands of metal for delivery against an LME contract; 
- Approval of official LME warehouses. 
Membership. There are three categories of membership: 
- Ring-dealing membership ; 
- Associate membership (i. e. , non-FtLng-dealing) ; 
- Individual membership (this is a small group of people, among whom 
is the Buffer Stock Manager of the International Tin Council). 
There are 28 Ring-dealing members,about 70 associate members, and 
22 individual suscribers. 
The qualification common to all classes of membership is the possession 
of not less than two shares in the Meta]. Market and Exchange Company., 
Companies represented in the Ring must satisfy certain financial demands, 
i.e., a substantial margin of.solvency. The company represented may nominate 
one or more "authorized clerks*̂  to trade in the Ring on its behalf. Approval 
of these clerks is a matter for the Committee. 
Of the present Ring-dealing members, about half correspond to the 
ownership or control by interests outside the United Kingdom. The companies 
represented on the LME are typically specialized branches of metal 
corporations, and particularly of transnational type. 
LME brokers/members fall into three categories: 
- Members who deal primarily for one particular client (representing 
usually his parent company); 
- Members who are general dealers and have many clients; , 
- Members who deal mainly for one client, but are also general traders. 
/Several major ̂  
Several major traders in non-ferrous metals (e.g., Delta Metals, BICC, 
Pirelli and the Chloride Group) do not trade on the LME via subsidiaries 
but through several Ring-dealing members, who may change over time. 
The four largest and most influential members of the LME areJ 
Member Parent Company 
Rudolf Wolff and Co., Ltd. Noranda (Canada) 
Metallgesellschaft Ltd. Metallgesellschaft (W. Germany) 
Billiton-Enthoven Metals Ltd. Royal Dutch Shell (United Kingdom/ 
......... Netherlands) 
Amalgamated Metal Trading Ltd. . Pat in o N. V. (based in the 
Netherlands) 
With reference to the CTS/AMC merger described earlier it is of 
interest to note that, in 1971, AMC was re-constituted.by the merger of 
two companies—British Metal Corporation (BMC) and Henry Gardner.. Both 
BMC and Henry Gardner were Ring-dealing members of the LME. After the merger 
both gave up their seats and AMC's wholly owned subsidiary, Amalgamated 
Metal Trading, gained a seat on the "Ring". 
The standard contract at the LME states: 
- Geographical location of the commodity (usually LME approved and 
registered warehouses); 
- Date of delivery; 
- Quality of the commodity (e.g. , 98°/i tin); 
- Quantity of delivery. 
There are two main types of dealing associated with the LME: 
- Ring-dealing; 
- Kerb-dealing and pre-market dealing. 
It is upon the comparatively brief Ring-dealing that the whole pricing 
edifice of the LME is based. Between noon and 1.05 pm there are short 
sessions of official trading in copper, silver, tin, lead and zinc, on the 
Ring. Between 3. 35 pm and 4,35pm there ere a further unofficial short 
/sessions of 
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sessions of trading in the same metals. It is in the first official tradings 
on the Ring that the LME prices are determined. 
The restricted times allowed for official dealings led naturally to 
members remaining in the Ring after the final be.l and continuing to do 
business amongst themselves. The authorities bowed to the inevitable 
and set aside a limited period after each official Ring session for "Kerb" 
trading. 
There is also a "pre-market" conducted before noon which enables the 
authorized clerks to come to the Ring each day with a far more concise and 
calculated programme before them than would otherwise have been possible. 
Because the LME has no clearing house, nor any centralized system of 
recording or registering all trades done,, it is not easy to make an estimate 
of the proportion of each member's daily turnover which is.transacted by 
way of pre-market and Kerb, dealings, but it is safe to say that it 
represents a considerable proportion. 
The LME provides also scope for trading in futures, and consequently 
opportunities for hedging and speculative activities which are common to ' 
all other similar markets. Less common is the LME practise whereby future 
prices may be quoted for specific days rather than specific months. 
Looking towards the future, it now seems likely that the LME will 
move away from being a "principals", market, and became more of a ."clearing' 
house" market. This is to be accomplished by a monitoring system. The 
LME would establish a credit controller whose duty would be look for 
possible difficulties in the extent of any one member's overnight open 
position on the market vis-a-vis his funding, and.to report these to a 
control committee. It is widely accepted that this monitoring system 
would perhaps hinder speculative activities and be conducive to a more 
secure market. 
/(ii) The Penang 
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(ii) The Penang tin market r..: 
The Penang tin market operates like a "tender system" of marketing, 
whereby the smelters, undertake the smelting, sale and:pricing of tin metal 
on behalf of the miners. However, as stated earlier, it is the world's 
eminent physical market of tin where tin production from the two Malaysian 
smelters, Datuk Keramat and Straits Trading is marketed. This amounts ,to 
about 40°/o of world sales of this commodity. 
The sellers in the mairket are the. numerous tin miners and buyers are 
traders and consumers of.tin metal and their agents.. .Thus,, the. Penang 
market is a one way market snd successful bidders cannot resell the metal 
in the market. In practise, however, tin warrants can; be, and often are, 
transferred to private purchasers outside the formal market structure. 
Another feature of the Penang market, is the. total, lack of information 
about the prices and tonnages, offered by miners, the prices and tonnages 
of the bids, and the amount of stock held by the smelters.; The Penang tin 
market is not a terminal market and it.has no facilities for.forward 
transactions nor for futures trading. However, moves are underway to set-
up a Kuala Lumpur Exchange to deal in tin futures. 
In the case that the Kuala Lumpur futures market were a reality, 
the bargaining position of the producing developing countries would be 
tremendously enhanced. The Malaysian smelters would play .the role of the 
liquidated William Harvey smelter in United Kingdom Jj and the still ' 
operating U.S. Capper Pass smelter with respect to the LME, i.e. , they 
would hedge all their concentrate purchases. With flexible exchange 
controls and more specific delivery dat.es afforded by a futures market, 
western consumers would have the option of hedging on Kuala Lumpur market. 
2/ See part 4. above. 
/This would 
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This would diminish the international trader's role and the LME turnover, 
as a proportionate amount of consumer hedging could also logically be 
carried out on Kuala Lumpur.-; This! would automatically increase the 
bargaining power of Malaysia and other producing countries. Of course, this 
would not prevent' int'erhaticinMl' trader's from operating in the'Kuala Lumpur 
market as well, \J 
\J Syed Hasan Bin Ali and Ahamd Zubeir Bin Haji Noordin, "The Penang Tin 
Market", in Bank Negara Bulletin. Malaysia, Vbl. 8, NP 3/'September • " t *mr »>,„<»• FT- ̂f-yi-t-f » rt-.-r- -r îa ywr .?* * f * 9 
1975. "Workings of Penang", Metal, Bulletin Monthly,. September 1976 
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Parir II 
i 
TIN "'INDUSTRY IN: BOLIVIA ¡./WD LINKAGES-VÇTH TNÎ s 
Initial, period of ,the industry and its natjonalizat: ion in 1952 
n . i . • « « m mmsmmi* 
•t. . 
In examining the initial period of Bolivian mining the conclusion is 
that in the first quarter of this century TNCs did not expand in Bolivian 
tin mining as in other mineral producing countries of the region. The 
salient fact of the starting tin-boom in Bolivia is the appropriation 
of many mines by Chilean and, on a lesser scale, British entrepreneurs 
who had no direct relation with transnational in mining. 
It was a Bolivian national, Sirndn I. Patino, who bought out most of 
the foreign capital invested in tin mining, thus succeeding in 
"Bolivianizing" it. On the other hand, he merged later his enterprise with 
a United States TNC (National Lead Co. ) to organize in 1924 the Patino 
Mines and Enterprises Consolidated Inc., under the laws of Delaware, 
United States. Patino subsequently chose the United Kingdom as a base 
for his business transactions and organized a large-scale transnational 
tin mining corporation, which was integrated from the exploitation of mines 
to the smelting and refining of tin. He possessed mines not only in 
Bolivia but also in Malaysia and Nigeria, as well as the most important 
tin smelting plants of the world in Germany, United Kingdom, Malaysia, 
Nigeria and Australia. Moreover, in order to ensure the transport of ore 
exploited in Bolivia to smelters in the United Kingdom, he assumed control 
of the. Cpmpapia. Slid Americana de Vapores. J/ 
\J See the présent structure of the Patina graup in figure 2 above. 
/During the 
- 23 -
During the first two decades of this, century», tax revalue obtained 
from mining was very small, which permitted the building up of large 
personal fortunes while thé State-did not receive the proper income. 
It was in the mining entrepreneurs1 interests that this state of affairs 
should not change; hence their gradually increasing participation in the. , 
country's politics. It was not until ;the .beginning of,the 1920s that a . 
tax was imposed on mining profits, invested .capital and exports. 
On the other hand, thé Supreme Decree of dune 1939 which established, 
that foreign exchange obtained from mineral exports should be handed over 
to the Central Bank was derogated by the subsequent government in the same 
year. ..•-. . 
b) Nationalization ,in 1952 ..... 
The low price of tin during the Second World War j/ and in the early 
J/ United State's monopsonistic power in Bolivian mining, supported by . 
Patino9s transnational interests, and its implications for the country8s 
economy were severely-criticized by several authors, as for example! 
"During the Second World War Bolivia remained tied to a contract covering 
the sale of tin for five years, when undertook to sell at 42 US cents per. 
fine pound of tin to the United States and United Kingdom. During the 
same period, copper, lead and zinc produced in the United States 
experienced increases of 39% and 67% respectively. Tin increased 
by 55%.. It would have sufficed for tin prices to "come fairly close to ' 
those of"the United States production for the country to be able to 
capitalize... The United States Government was against monopolies; 
nevertheless, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a government agency, 
was a monopoly whicty possessed exclusive rights over purchases and price*-
fixing". (Sergio Almarza, EL poder y_ la caída, see the selective' 
bibliography.-) -Furthermore, William Fox, former .Secretary-of the - , 
International Tin Council, in his study "Tin, the working of a Commodity 
Agreement" $aid: "The fact that the United States dióuld have suddenly 
.suspended its tin purchases in 1951 and then reinitiated them at low prices 
imposed unilaterally with the'objective of establishing its strategic 
reserve was in the worst hard-handed tradition pnd came close to actual 
blackmail". Finally, the Bolivian delegation at the United Nations 
• General Assembly'in 1951 protested in the following, terms: '?The price, of ' 
tin, which is the backbone of the Bolivian economy, has for many months 
been subject to the criterion of a single buyer, the United States^ against 
which a weal< country like Bolivia is unattLe i;o-defend itself. This büyeiv 
has imposed on Bolivia these- exceptionally low prices^ using the.'jnê hods of 
the strong against' the Weak, which §o beyond the bounds of correct 
behaviour and the inter-American co-operation which one has a right to 
expect". . , /post-war 
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post-war years,social disputes, and the transn$£ipnal• expansion of the 
Patino group on the? basis of Bolivia's mining wealth, continued to mpbilize , 
the country's.public opinion increasingly against Patino and the other two 
"tin bdrons" :(Hochschild and Aramayo). ;, The mining entrepreneurs even tried ; 
to impose their own presidential candidate in the, 1951 elections. After the. 
new Government.; of the Nationalist - Revolutionary;Movement assumed ̂in April 
1952 it nationalized larger-scale mining,by a decrep pf ;October that year. 
•The economic importance of the three large mining groups nationalized 
in 1952 may be. appreciated in the light of their .production, of metallic, .. . 
tin in- 1941 and. .1951 and-i-n-comparison with the ,mpdium-and small-scale-, 
mining of the many individual entrepreneurs: 
ti-i»r-ft -Trf-'—'-l-nfrlrrftrt 
• 1̂ 41 . , ; ,: -,,.̂5-1 : - -
Metric tons Percentage Metric tons Percentage 
mtino '. ' .." 20/013 J '4S.8 , '1& 998 [', ...' 44,5 
HpchSch'ild • 10 829, ••' 25.-2 ' ;'• • '' ̂ 6 812 • '• '" 20.0 
'Aramayo 2 547, ".. - , 6.0 , ; • - 2- 692 ;.... 6.0; 
Total, larger-scale • , • , ; ,,. „ . 
mining . , -••. 33 489 -78.0 , ,¿4 502, ' . 7a, 5. 
T "1 'h i j .Ujr f&J * > " t — * m r - M ' i J ! ' B ' l i U l i l r t ' i ' T I * JUM 
Medium-scale mining " '5, ̂ 07 .13,5 ' ; " ,..3 598." ' 11.0' 
Small-scale mining - • -3 544- ' 8.5 •" ' 5 564 " * - " 16. 5 
••} TjOtal .Etolivia • •' 42J740 , 100.0 - 33 664 ; J0q._0 
The three large-scale mining- groups represented over 70°/o and of these 
the Patino Group represented over 4.4% of the, country's total production. J/ 
The nationalized mining grdups which hSd- failed in their legal attempt 
to embargo'Bolivia's mining exports abroad,, cunningly toqk advantage of the 
~\f , In 1975 the nationalized min^ in large-scale mining . reduced their share 
. in favour of ¡nedium-scale mining, { 18°/o), . ... —J- that 
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fact that nearly all the tin concentrates .would Jbe;errivir®. qfcxthe Bĵ Lfcish 
Williams Harvey and Co. smelter, controlled by the Patina group. They, imposed . 
on the'Government of Bolivia a compulsory discount jof 1,0°/o on the;grp£s 
value of the ore smelted in the Patiino- ovyned ramelters.. This discount was 
being retained as-dn advance on the compensation which'the Bolivian Government 
should pay for the value of the' nationalized mines. The following payments 
were made under this head from April 1953 to August 1961: c 
To the Patino'group ' USO 9*164,89? - ; " 
To the -Hochschil'd group ' ' 7,431,-190 
To^the Aramayo group ' " • , 3,260,058 
: "' -.US® 19,856k 145 : 
The total indemnity which the Bolivian^Government. was to .pay to these 
three groups was never fixed. The discounts made by the Williams Harvey 
smelter ended with the introduction of the Triangular Plan for, reconditioning 
the nationalized mined (see sectibnt2). • < 
2.. National control over tin mining and achievements of CQMIBDL 
a) The post-nationalization problems 
In 1952, after nationalizing the three largest mining enterprises in 
the country the Bolivian Government created the Corporacidn Minera de 
Bolivia (CQMXBQL.) to run the mines. \J After having experienced an initial 
decline in production during its first ten years of operations, COMIQDL 
succeeded in boosting production and labour productivity steadily ¿ince 1961. 
In fact, since then, all indicators such as export earnings and payments to 
the government have shown significant upward trends. The production of tin; 
\J It should be noted that CQMIBOL is diversified enterprise producing 
zinctungsten, copper, lead and other-minerals,' in addition to tin., , 
/declined from 
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declined""from 31 700 tons in 1950 to 19 7000 tons-.in 1960., or by 4.,6%. , 
in yearly average, but then recovered in 1970 to 30 100 tons surpassing , 
the prenationaiizatidr* l«/at in>¿1977 (32-600 tons),, .Bolivia rained in 
this way Its highly predominant position in the; region (81. 5°/o qf 4*>e total) 
although the production of tin in Brazil. (Rondonia}'..expanded from. ,1 300 tons 
in 1960 to 6 400 tons in 1977, -reaching 16P/o of Latin /Vnê ican tin production 
(see table 8). ;' ."• - - i 
The number of employe.es of C0MIB0L rose from 29 000. in- 1952. to a high 
of 37 000 in 1956 after which ,it declined steadily to 25 000 iniK1975. In 
conformity with the rise of production, the production of tin per worker, 
after experiencing a decline from .9.44 kilogrammes in 1952 to 526 kilogrammes 
at the1 beginning of 1960s, -rose, significantly and reached. 841 kilogrammes 
in 19.75." • • • . •- , • • : t ,. • , _ v ..... .. - , 
;'"" - THe decline in. tin production after the jnation.ê izatipn can.,be attributed 
to several main factors. In the first,¡pjLaoe, it was ̂  -continuation of the 
declining trend from the alltime peal< Bolivian production reached during 
the Second World War,- aggravated'-furtherwore by ttffe--contraction in tin 
consumption during 1950s. At the war time, Bolivia's mines were exploited 
almost. beyond capacity to supply the western defense industry substituting 
the resources of South East Asia., Thus, in 1945 Bolivian^tin production 
reached 42 000 tons declining abruptly to 31 700 tons in 1950 (see again 
table 8). 
Secondly.and clue partly to a lack of exploration activities before 
nationalization and the wartime over exploitation, the quality of the ground 
mined deteriorated causing a decline in the tin content of the ore. Thirdly, 
there was an exodus of 170 of the 200 foreign engineers after nationalization. 
Serious management problems—common to all newly nationalized firms—had 
been aggravated-by the fact that G0MIB0L.-took over some 17 plants belonging 
/to the 
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to the three nationalized enterprises and. being., of varying size, quality 
of ore, obsoletnes^of equipment and infrastructure, profitability, etc. 
Finally/attiong external factors contributing, to. the decline .in. production 
were the marketing problems linked with TNCs domination, the termination of 
United States Stockpile'' purchases ...around .1958,- followed,by the export 
controls imposed by the International Tin, Gounoil during 1958-1960. J/ 
The downfall in production, coupled by. an increase in thelabour force 
mentioned earlier, contributed to the losses in accounting terms suffered 
by C0MI80L* during its initial years of operation.. However, if gains are . 
defined as retained value of exports, the internalization of gains in the 
country as a consequence of nationalization is definitely a positive factor, 
regardless of accounting losses suffered by the state enterprise. 
b) The upturn of the industry.since.1960s and, its importance in the 
Lvia 
' " • • • 1 . . • 
The upturn of.Bolivian tin. industry in 1950s was facilitated by the 
improvement in the international climate in, favour of developing countries. 
Once the international community has accepted the idea that nationalization 
is not a radical move to be punished, but rather a reflection of the desire 
of countries to gain sovereignity over their natural resources and to 
maximize the benefits derived.from them, a new working relationship can be 
established in which industrialized countries and transnational corporations 
should still play a major role, in the various new forms of partnership with 
state enterprises. 
An expression of this new international climate and changing attitudes 
towards ¡the nationalized tin industry of Bolivia was a Triangular Plan 
Jl/. See part 1.5. a) above. . - . 
2/ For detail on factors explaining the losses see: William Fox, Tin: The 
Workings of a Commodity Agreement, Mining Journal Books, London, 1974, 
P* /introduced in 
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introduced in 1961-and invblving the; Governmênts of Bolivia, the United States, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and the Inter-Arfierican Development Bank. 
This plan, worth of U. S.031 million and covering the 1961-1971 period, 
envisaged the recapitalization of COMIBQL through;.external loans, the 
strengthening of management and a- substantial reduction .  of surplus labour. . 
The steady increase in production and piroduCtivity since 1961 was partly-
due to this pian and made it possible to repay, the" external'loans, until » 
1976. At' the samfe time, this- plan contributed to. the final settlement with 
nationalized TNCs and ended the compensation payments, .in 1961 (see section 1. 
above). " -, <•,,-• 
During the 1970s the-tin industry maintained its leading .role in the.:. 
economy of¿Bolivia. From the overview of main indicators in table 9 can < 
be concluded, that export incomes'of the industry, increased[from USG millions. 
107.0 in 1970 to 171.4 in 1975 and to 37a 7 in 1978, or: three • and half times 
more than at thé beginning of the decade. This substantial increase was 
due to the coming on stream of the new smelter and particularly to the 
dramatic increase of the tin prices (3.3 times), related with the world 
inflation. The strategic importance of tin for the economic and social' 
development of Bolivia is therefore more adequately reflected in its role 
in total export and public budget incomes (52°/> and 18°/o in 1978) than in 
relatively low shares of GNP and employment (5% and 3.5°/0). j/ 
With regard to the surplus component of COMIBOL's operations, it is 
difficult to compare the performance of a state enterprise which has 
national development functions to perforin, with that of privatè enterprise 
whose main aim is to earn profits. Throughout its 15 years of operations, 1 
2/ ^The shares in public budget incomes (royalties) and ÔNP include other 
.'•;_• .¡minerals as'well. ' • • ; . . -,. • ..• 
* ' ' ' '' Î1""- ' ..V /-V-- . ' .." 
: ; /net retained 
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net retained value of exports has d£f;Ln:jLt,ely, bpen larger than would have 
been the case without nationalization. As table 10 shows C0MIB0L has been 
reaching continous profit and increasing net income throughout the 
1965-1975 period. C0MIB0L also "contributes to the state budget paying a 
variety of taxes to the government, that is royalties, J/ export taxes 
(since 1972), import duties and income taxes. Total taxes paid by C0MIB0L 
in 1974 amounted to Bolivian Peso 873 million in comparison with 37 million 
in 1965 and 387 and 221 millions paid in 1974 by medium and small mining 
enterprises, respectively (see table 11). the economic achievements of 
COMIBQL have been positively influenced by the substantial increase of 
vjorld prices, described above. On the other hand, the enterprise had to 
j • . 1 1 ' ^ 
bear increasing costs caused by sharp inflationary process without any 
change in the exchainge rate of U. S. 0' which had been, maintained since the o 
devaluation of Bolivian ;Peso in 1972. 
Not all of COMIBOL's production is exported, An increasing proportion 
is being delivered to. the state-owned Empre'sa; Nacibnal de Fundiciones 
(ENAF) 
• tin smelter at Vinto, which started production in 19,71, reflecting another 
important progress in increasing the gains from tin industry through forward 
linkage activities. The ENAF refinery at. present refin(es more than., a half 
of Bolivia's tin in concentrates and expansion plans are underway to boost 
smelting capacity and production in order to eventually smelt all of 
Bolivia's tin', as "will be discussed in point 3 below. 
\J Although royalties are normally paid by a foreign enterprise for the ^ 
extraction of a natural resource, C0MIB0L has' paid similar taxes to 
the government, based .on t-he rate of production. . .. 
- /3. National 
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3. National development of 
At the time of nationalization in 1952, the bulk of Bolivian tin 
concentrates went to the Williams Harvey smelter in the United Kingdom 
owned Joy the group of Patina (Consolidated Tin Smelters). Williams Harvey 
was.established by Patino in 1929 as a holding company to consolidate his 
smelting interests in the United Kingdom and Malaysia. Patino had no 
interest in building a smelter in Bolivia and preferred to utilize the 
country solely as a source of minorai resources for his integrated 
transnational activities. This may be illustrated by the following 
statement contained in the Annual Report of Patino Mines and Enterprises 
Consolidated Inc. for 1938: 
"Our Bolivian concentrates and, practically all minerals of high 
metal'¿ontent, are smelted and refined in the United Kingdom purely 
for economic reasons. Our experience, and recent studies made* by our 
technical experts show that it is cheaper to smelt and refine tin in 
tBe plants of Williams 'Harvey and Co. iri Bootle, near Liverpool , than 
. anywhere else, Jn addition to the local conditions at Bootle, a 
determining factor is the long and unequalled experience of Williams Harvey 
in the treatment'of the complex Bolivian ores in 'which they have''specialized 
:for over 25, years. Thus our Company, and in genera?, all enterprises in 
Bolivia, are able to obtain the lowest possible rate for smelting and 
refining our tin coricentrâtes. This represents valuable-co-operation in 
the. development of tin mining in Bolivia .which, as,is, well know, is affected 
by some adverse factors". 
Although according to the short-term commercial criterion of 
transnational corporations, Patino,s position was justified, the fact is 
that not even the successive governments of Bolivia have had the. long-term, 
•vision to exert.pressure ,for the establishment of a tin smelter in the 
country. As noted earlier,: Aj Malaysia's experience, was different since 
the establishment of tin smelters at the beginning of the century was 
1/' ; -See-fart I, section —̂  /stimulated by 
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stimulated by an additional tax on exports of' concentrates. Bolivia failed 
to take effective steps 't&waWs the installation of a tin smelter until 
the mid-1960s.1 After nationalization, however, it did break the monopoly 
of the Williams Harvey smelter, concluding a contract in 1962*for the 
smelting of part of its tin output in the Texas plant'thten controlled by 
the Wah-Cftang Corporation.1 • 
In the 1960s the Government of Bolivia came to the conclusion that 
the country should build its own tin smelters, not only to earn additional 
foreign exchange from forward linkage operations but also to be less 
'dependent on specific foreign smelters and by implication, foreign markets. 
In 1965, negotiations started "with a German engineering group and in 1966 
the State enterprise Bnpresa NaCional de:Fundiciones, ENAF, was established 
obtaining a monopoly of producing and exporting of refined metal. 
Construction of a tin smelter began in that year and in January 1971, ENAF 
put on stream the refinery at Vinto, with an initial capacity of 7,500 
tons. \J The plant was'constructed wit'H'German suppliers' credits by 
KLoekner Humbolt Oeutch, a metal and engineering group which also 
constructed the'refinery for the Indonesian Peltim" smelter at MOntok. 
In 1975Bolivia was still highly depended on'foreign smelters for 
refining its tin concentrates. Only orfe quarter of the total sales of 
concentrates had been processed in the national ENAF smelter in Vinto, 
The remainder was exported to different foreign smelters particularly 
in! the 'A S. , United Kingdom, Spain and Brazil (see table 12). The foreign 
smelters refining Bolivian tin' concentrates are mainly large and integrated 
TNCs with world-wide' marketing of tin metal, as may be seen from table '13' 
end the following overviews 
Information in this part is based on; Carlos Alcoreza Melgarejo, . 
La Corporacidn Minera de Bolivia y su influencia en la economia nacional, 
COMIBOL, La Paz, 1976; International Tin Council, Notes on Tin, various 
issues; IBRD, Report N°1251a-B0, Present Position.and Prospects of the 
Mining and Metallurgical Sector of Bolivia,. November 1976 and various 
issues of ENAF annual reports. . , /The Long Horn 
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The Long Horn smelter established. by the Llnite$ States Government 
through Billlton Co»; during the Second World War,was subsequently 
purchased by"Wah-Cheng' Gorpi and then sold to the. Gulf Resources and 
Chemical«Corp. Gulf Resources ̂ lso controls pinker Hill Co«,, which owns , 
important, silver, lead and,.zinc mines in Idaho, fIts principal office is 
in Kellog-Idaho, This melter processed 31°/o of the Bolivian Mining , 
Corporation's- 1975 tin production, ; .•• • • 
• ¡The;.major: smelter (in the United Kingdom at present is., that of ... t 
Capper Pass and Son Ltd, in North Humberside, Yorkshire,, which mainly ; 
processes -ore with, a low metal content, • ;It is conjpletely controlled Jay . the, 
Rio. Tinto. Zinc Corporation Ltd,, holding company.with interest in 
Australia, Canada, .the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles,. Papua, . , 
New Guinea,.South Africa, the United Kingdom and,the United States. In . 
1975' the' 'Capper Pass smelter processed 24% of the tin output of the , 
Bolivian Mining Corporation.• : v -.,.,.• 
The*Federal Republic of Germany,has •the Berzelius Metallhutten . 
Gesellschaft m»b,b,.smelter in Duisburg, which is owned by the , 
Metallgesellschaft .A, G, , an important firm vdth a long, tradition in the 
field pf minerals and no n-f,errors metals, covering the production, smelting, 
refining and marketing stages,, A number of medium-scale miners in Bolivia 
send their concentrates J® this smelter. . •. 
Brazil has, three;smelters: .Malta, fledonda, controlled by Consolidated 
Tin Smelters''(Patipo}; Mamore; Smelting,, owned, by .the. Iacombe construction 
group; and an-,independent.shelter in Rio de Janeiro, These smelters mainly 
process the ore produced in.Rondonia, Brazil, where active exploration 
activities are going on. Twelve mining groups srp working there, particularly 
in the Cadeias river basin. Small quantities of Bolivian concentrates have 
been smelted in Volta Redonda. 
' /Presently the ' 
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Presently the tin smelter in Vinto which exported 16 000 tons in 
1978 is being expanded to a capacity of 20 000 tons per year. The expansion 
of refining capacities entailed large scale investment of some USC75 million, 
the bulk of which wa.s financed by credits from West Germany and socialist 
countries. While the first Vinto smelter has been designed for the 
treatment of;high grade tin, a new plant is being constructed at the same 
site .for the treatment of low grade tin with a capacity of approximately 
10 000 tons. Aj Both the expansion of the existing smelter and the 
construction of:the new one are being undertaken by Kloeckner Industries, 
the second pne in conjunction with Paul Bergsoe of Denmark̂  Thus, by the 
beginning of 1980s Bolivia wi.ll have a tin smelting capacity of some 
30 000 tons, capable of smelting domestically all of its tin concentrates 
production. .. 
The expansion of ¡tin smelter's capacity throughout the 1970s made it 
possible to: increase the output of tin metal from 700 tons in 1970 to : 
16 000 tons.in 1978 accounting for more than a half of total production of 
tin in.concentrates (see, table 14). About two thirds of ENAF's tin is -
supplied by C0MIB0L and the rest by medium mines. The small mines supply 
little to ENAF due to low tin content of their concentrates. 
In spite of these encouraging developments, ENAF encountered with 
accounting losses and problems during the initial years of its operations 
(see table 15). One of the problems was that although the smelter's 
capacity has been still in expansion, infrastructure had been built for the 
final capacity of 20 000 tons causing this way large overhead costs. Also 
J/ Mining Magazine, March 1977. There is discussion of the possibility of 
USSR Machino Export Enterprise participation in the construction of the 
second smelter. In this case the new smelter would provide an 
interesting example of• joint venture; the State enterprise ENAF 
co-operating with private companies in Germany and Denm'ark, and with the 
USSR state enterprise. /the inflationary 
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the inflationär y process'sincte 1972, mentioned above in relation with 
COMIBQL, had'negative-effects on the enterprise costs.' 
As in'the case -ci-f̂ COMIBOL "s5 operations/ it 'is- important to rèàlize-
•that' forward linkage corresponding to ENAF smeltihg is -important-not 
only for gainé in-a narrow sense'(profits)y but- particularly for : — 
-internalization of incomes- originated iri- the-, tin industry. - In this manner, 
thë;retainèd value is'-definitely enhanced by increasing the '-3/o'cal - value 
addedj -even if: acCoûntif^-wise thê smelt-er suffers losèes. „J/. • In addition, 
: the:smelting of tin domestically may lead in the futurè'to further forward 
linkage effects such 'as fabrication of tin -based'products.-• Finally, local 
smelting viould-increase thë 'negotiating'-capacity of the ̂government 
vis^-yis tin TIMCs and their st'-i-ll strong marketing -power. - VC:"> -
On the other hand, sales of tin metal rather than concentrates .'-would 
hot automatically release the country 'from the control of international 
metal traders.'It éas shown above that the marketing Operations are still 
•controlled by- powerful traders «t the LME.. The issues related • with "'.tin' 
marketing'in Bolivia àre overviewed in, the following and final. section, s 
•of this paper. ;'r "• " - • ' - '.' . "'• ••• 
-,7, . ,4. TNCs_ ppjvtrol over marketing..Q(f ,.f̂ .liyian.Ĵ in 2j . 
Control over marketing is an important "element in the bargaining 
. . . • • 1 .-• ... .\ ,1 - , 
balance between governments and TNCs. The establishment of tin smelters 
in producing .countries described abbve would not only increase the foreign 
exchange earned from tin activities but aiso provide a better control over 
the marketing of tin metal and the possibility to sell it directly to final 
•consumers. . . . . ';"; 
J/ ' Of course., this assertion does ..not," deny the importance of .publ ic enterprise 
: efforts to decrease, production and othejr costs -contributing, thus more to 
the country's development. 
2/- '"' This part 'will be completed and updated by Mr. Alfonso Versalavie, the 
Bolivian expert participating in the Bangkok Interregional Meeting. 
/The present 
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The present problem? of tin marketing in Bolivia are largely associated 
with the low, grade and riot easily..marketable, tin .concentrates proceeding 
mainly from small mines. Their sales are limited to...the foreign refineries 
specializing in low grade processing, such, as the Texas shelter in the 
United States. As shown earlier", the present ENAF,-operated, pmelter can 
only process relatively :|>igh grade .(arqund 45 per .cent) tin concentrates. 
Any lasting, improvement in the market position of the Bolivian tin 
industry will have to.await^the completion o.f the new low grade smelter 
mentioned In .tftetpart ,3»; above. . .. . 
The State o.wne.d mining bank Banco Minero (BAMIN), was established as 
the principal credit, marketing and technical assistance institution, 
including provision-of., equipment and current inputs „for the private and 
especially small ..mines* BAMIN-.extends working capital loans and loans 
for investment., j As a marketing entity, it buys tin concentrates from 
small ..mines and co-operatives, (except those producing .for COMIBOL). BAMIN 
mainly undertakes•spot sales for relatively.small individual shipments. 
Apart from its"shipments, to-the low grade smelters, in Europe, other 
shipments,by BAMIN are almost; entirely;taken.up .by ipetal traders which 
tend to make it subject to collusion on pqrfc of.,its purchasers. International 
trading•firms act as principals, thus excluding mineral suppliers from 
decisions over timing and destination of sales.,,, While trading firms 
generally pay-immediately after delivery, their commission could be as 
much as 20°/o .of the sales price. \j\ 
>• \ The international trading firms which are most active in, Bolivia are: 
Phillip Brothers, C. Ten.nat, and Sons, Metal Traders and Sud Americana de 
Minerales y Metales, all important traders in the LME. . ' 
J/ - See again IBRD, Report N° 1251a-B0, op.cit., p. 11. The following 
discussion draws heavily on this source unless otherwise indicated. 
/Phillip Brothers 
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Phillip;Brothers is a subsidiary of Engelhard .Minerals and Chemicals 
Corporation based in New York and with agencies in 25 countries all over 
the world.. Other subsidiaries of. this company are Engelhard Industries 
Division which refines, fabricates and markets precious metals and the. 
Minerals and Chemical Division, which;exploits minerals-like:bauxite, etc. 
As indicated, above, Phillip Brothers are engaged in Brazil in a joint 
venture: withi the Patino owned CESBRA company for tin .exploration and 
mining. . Phillip Brothers ..has, also exclusive; marketing of the tin 
concentrates from mines pertaining previously to Grace, and Co. " (Estalsa* 
International Mining, and Ayicaya) vjhich represent approximately , one half 
of private:-Medium. Mines,'production • • •• • -.-.« 
. C. Tennant. ..and;'Son: Co....is a;subsidiary of Consolidated Gold Fieldŝ ". 
with interests in South Africa,-Australia, Canada, New Zeland, Norway, the 
United. Kingdom, and the-United States.- Metal; Traders Inc. is ¡based, in 
New York and maintains- subsidiaries among other in London and La Paz. 
It ..is-a much smaller company, than the" two previously cited. .-Finally • 
Sud American^ de Mineral es'.y-Metal es is a subsidiary of! Amalgamated Metal 
Corporationi controlled by Patino, N, V. As indicated earlier, Patifio's 
smelting interests are linked to its marketing companies. 
The above overview shows that marketing-of Bolivian tin is .still v 
largely controlled by the powerful traders which dominate the LME. The 
success. of Bolivia in achieving shortly selfsufficiency. in smelting will 
automatically have favourable repercussions;on the marketing as well. 
However, a structural improvement in marketing can only-be achieved through 
the training of cadresin this sophisticated but crucial, field .which 
ultimately determines the .gains through price formation. ....... '. ' 
The actual distribution of gains at the market level,--depends primarily 
on two factors: first,' the" process of price formation in international 
;1•; /markets and 
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markets and the importance of the bargaining power of governments in those 
markets, and second, the negotiations regarding the many discount clauses 
which can increase or reduce actual gains, given international prices. 
Although COMIBGL, ENAF and BAMIN combined have a sales volume large enough 
to exert a powerful bargaining position in the international markets, the 
government has to strengthen a co-ordinated marketing approach and the 
knowledge about international minerals and freight markets and particularly 
the forward price movements on the London Metal Exchange. In this sense 
a rather positive factor is that the tin sales are geographically diversified 
corresponding in 1975 to western european countries 41%, United States 24%, 
Latin American countries 10% and socialist countries 13% of the total 








WORLD PRODUCTION OF TIN IN CONCENTRATES, TIB METAL AMD CONSUMPTION OF TIN METAL 
: ' . . . . ..... (1973-1975 AVERAGES) 
Major t in in concentra 
producers 
Production o f t i n in 
concentrates Production of t i n metal Consumption o f t i n metal 
Thousands 
o f tons 
Percentage 
o f world 
t o t a l 
Thousands 
• o f tons 
Percentage 
of world 




o f world 
t o t a l 
Aust ra l i a 10o3 4.8 6 .8 3.0 4.3 1.8 
Bo l i v i a 28.5 13.2 7 .1 3.1 - -
China 22.9 10.6 22.9 10.1 ' 1 4 . 0 5.8 
., Indonesia 24.0. 11.2 ; 15.8 6 .9 0 .4 , . 0 .2 
Malaysia 68.3 31 «7 83.3 36.6 - -
.N iger ia 5 .3 - 2.5 5.4 2.4 - -
Thailand 19o2 8.9 19.8 6.7 - -
Za i re 4.8 2 .2 0.7 0 .3 -
Major t in consumers 
France - _ 11.0 4.6 
Germany - - - - 15=2 6.3 
I t a l y - - - - 8.6 3.6 
Japan 0.7 0 .3 1.3 0 .6 33.5 13.9 
United Kingdom 3o6 1.7 18.4 8.1 16.5 6.8 
United States of America - • 6.8 3.0 56.7 23.5 
Soviet Union 13.7 6.4 14.0 6 .2 19.3 8.0 
Other market economies 13.0 6.0 23.6 10.4 44.9 18.6 
Other s o c i a l i s t countries 1.1 0 .5 1 .3 0.6 l6o7 6.9 
World to ta l 215.4 100.0 227.2 100.0 241.1 100.0 
Sources World Metal S t a t i s t i c s , May 1977« 
- 40 -
Table 2 i .. 
.PRODUCTION OF PRIMARY TIN B¥ REGIONS, 1950-1977 
(Thousands of tens» percentage of world to ta l and acumulated average annual r a te o f growth) 
• - • • . A f r i c a -Asia-








t o t a l 
1950 • -23=3 103=5 1.9 - • 2o7 33=1 12<>4 176„9 
Part ic ipat ion in percentage 15.2 58.5 1.1 1.5 18o7 • 7 .0 I'OOoO 
I960 • 20.7 90=4 2=2 2 .2 ; 22.1 31=2 . 168=8 
Part ic ipat ion in percentage 12. 3 $3=5 1=3 13=1 18=5 lOOoO 
Growth ra te , 1950-1960 ' - 1 . 2 •• -1=3 1=5 -2=0 - 4 . 0 9=7 , r-0o5 
1970 . 19.6 v U 6 o 5 8=8 2.8 36.4 33=1 .... . 217=2 
Par t ic ipat ion in percentage 9=0 53=6 4.1 1.3 16.8 15=2 l'OO.O 
Growth r a te , 1960-1970 - 0 . 5 2.6 14.9 2.4 5=1 0=6 2.6 
1975 14.7 113=8 9=6 4.5 38o5 38.6 219=7 
Part ic ipat ion in percentage 6=7 51=8 4.4 2=0 17=5 17=6 lOOcO 
Growth ra te , 1950-1975 -I08 0=4 . 6.7 2.1 O06 4o6 . 0=9 
1977 12=9 117=7 10.0 5=1 40.0 , 38=9 ,.; 224.6 
Par t ic ipat ion in.percentage 5.7 ' 52=4 4=5 2 .3 17=8 17« 3 100.0 
Growth r a te , 1970-1977. -5=8 Ool . I08 8=9 s 1.4 '•' 2o3 0 .5 
Sources Metal S t a t i s t i c s , 1950-1959, 1957-1966, 1965-1975, Heta l i gese l l scha f t A=g=, Frankfurt am Itei.no 
a/ Centra l ly planned economies ( p a r t i c u l a r l y Peop le ' s Republic of China and Soviet Union« 
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Table 5 
PRODUCTION OF TIN IN RELATION. TO RESERVES 
(1975-1976 averages) 
Production 
„ , . . . (000 metric .Major producing countries . 
tons ) 
• ( A ) 
Austra l ia 10.34 330 3.1 
Bo l i v i a ! 27.87 1 000 2.8 
B raz i l a/ 5.45 610 0 .9 
China - 22.00 1 500 1.5 
Indonesia 24.19 2 400 1.0 
Malaysia 65.18 830 7.9 
N iger ia 4.32 280 1.5 
Thailand 18.70 1 200 1.6 
Soviet Unioiï . 30.00 620 4.8 • 
Za i ré . 4.08 200 2.0 
b/ World total " " 227.90 10 160 , 2.3 
Source; United States Department of the Inter ior , Bureau of Mines "Commodity Data Summaries 1977°° 
a/ From: United States Bureau of Mines, " T in " , in Mineral Facts and Problems, 1975» 




( B ) 
Rate o f 
production 
(percentage) 
( A ) / ( B ) 
Table 4 
CONTROL OVER THE WORLD'S TIN PRODUCTION! RANKING OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST COMPANIES, 1976 
. Recent production f i g u r e s ^ (1975) 
Percent - " Percent- * •: •. , s 













1« Government of Indonesia F0T0 Timah Indonesia . 24 400 l O O o O 11.7 Ve r t i c a l l y integrated ' s t a te monopoly 
although three f o r e i gn companies received 
explorat ion r i ghts under contracts 
2. Government of the peop le ' s 
Republic o f China 
State Tin 
Enterprise 
P0R0 China 23 000 
? 
100.0 l l o l V e r t i c a l l y in teg ra ted ; s t a te monopoly 
3« Government o f Bo l i v i a Corporación Minera 
de B o l i v i a (COMIBOL) 
Bolivia.- ' 21 225c/ 75=Oc/ 10.2c/ Horizontal ly integrated s ta te ente rpr i se . 
Other minerals produced! Z inc , antimony, 
tungsten, copper, l ead , s i l v e r , e t c . 
4„ Pernas (Holding company owned by 
Government o f Malaysia; 71.35% 














l . l " 
e/ 
Controls production o f 14, companies in 
London t i n group and 6 companies in 
charter consol idated, in addition,. i t s 
subs id i a r i e s in N i g e r i a fend Thailand own 
s i seab le - shares 0£ production i n these tvjo 
countr ies . . See Diagram § on pernas 
control over tin"companies 
a/ Sources used f o r the recent ownership d e t a i l s o f companies were: 
Far Eastern Economic Review, Apr i l 1, 1977« -
Asian Finance, April/May 1977» : ;; : 
International Tin Council , Notes on T in , various i s sue s . '• ' , • 
United States Bureau of Mines, "T in " , Chapter from Mineral Facts and Problems 1975, Bu l l e t in 667, Washington, 1976, 
Mineral Yearbook, 1974, Volume I , Washington, 1976» 
Walter Skinner, Mining Internat ional Yearbook, The Financial Times, London, 1976 and 1977 ed i t ions « 
b/ Production data taken from World Metal S t a t i s t i c s , May 1977« World Production, of t in - in -concent ra tes inc luding the s o c i a l i s t countr ies , i s estimated a t 
207 500 metric tons» .; ' . 
cf COMIBOL's production i s estimated at 7% of production f i g u r e from World Metal S t a t i s t i c s . The 75$ i s taken from COMIBOL s t a t i s t i c s f o r 1973 and 1974. 
d/ Ma lys ia ' s t i n dredges accounted f o r 31.6$ of t o t a l production. ' The Pernas Group, consist ing o f the 14 London t i n grotip companies and the 6 Charter Consolidated 
companies accounted f o r 76% of t h i s t o t a l , o r 24$ o f t o t a l Malaysian production. The Wal l Street Journal , November 9 , 1976«-Also Internat iona l Tin Counci l , 
Monthly S t a t i s t i c a l Bu l l e t in which shows that the bulk o f Malaysian production comes from small Malaysian Chinese f i rms operating grave pumps hydraul ic and 
open cast mines, accounting f o r more than 60$ o f t o t a l Malaysian production in recent years « 
e/ Quantities produced by tim subs id i a r i e s of the London t i n group in Thailand not known« 
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Table 5 
TIN MINING AND SMELTING BX PRINCIPAL PRODUCER COUNTRIES 
(Thousandsof tons of t in metal contcnt end percentage o f world t o t a l , 
annual averages o f 1951-1955 and 1971-1975 per iods ) 
i,1 ' . 
; 1951-1955 1971-1975 
Mining Percentage Smelting Percentage Mining Percentage Smelting Percentage 
Malaysia 59.5 • 34.4 67.7 38.6 71.4 38.4 85 . è 44.2 
Indonesia 34.4 19.9 • 0.9 0 .5 23.0 12.4. 13.7 7.1 
Bo l i v i a 31.9 18.4 0 .2 0.1 29.8 16.1 7.0 3 . 6 
Za i re 12.8 7.4 2.9 1.7 5.4 2.9 1.0 0.5 
Thailand 10.1 5.8 - •• 20.3 10.9 20.7 10.7 
Niger ia 8.4 4.9 r 6.0. 3.2 ' 6 .1 3.2 
Austra l ia 1.8 1.0 1.8 1.0 10.5 5.7 6.9 3.6 
Subtotal main J-
producers 158.9 91.8 73.5 41.9 166.4 89.6 . 141.0 72.9 
World to ta l a/ 173.1 100.0 175.3 100.0 185.8 100.0 193.5 . 100.0 
Source: International Tin Counci l , S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook, various issues and Tin S t a t i s t i c s , various i ssues» 
a/ Excluding centra l ly planned economics.. 
Table 6 




Parent company- Company-"^ P l an t l o c a t i o n 
Production 
capacity b/ 
Production i n 1975 ç / 
Remarks 
In tons 
As p e r -
centage 




' As p e r -
centage 
o f country 
; As p e r -
centage 
of. wor ld 




Corporat ion (53 .2$ 
owned by Patino NV, 
in 197?)b/ 
Companhia E s t a ñ í f e r a 
do B r a s i l ( Ce sb ra ) c/ 
(90 .8$ owned by PaTiño, 
NV, i n 1977) 
Datuk keramat Smelting 
Sendir ian Berhad (50 .5$ 
owned by AMC)_b/ 
Makery Smelting Company 




Tota l Patino Groujj 
Penang, Malays ia 
JOS, N i g e r i a 
A l exandr i a , N ^ W , 


















' 64 .3e/ 
1 / 
2 ; i 
2 .5 
- •1.6e/ 
See Diagram N2 on the 
Patino' ¡s. t i n a c t i v i -
t i e s , 1977, Amai-
•garaated_Metal Corpo-
r a t i o n i s a merger 
between Amalgamated 
: Metal ' Corpora t ion , 
, a c t i v e in t i n 
marketing and c o n s o l i -
dated t i n smelters 
both s u b s i d i a r i e s o f 
Pa t ino , NV. 
2 . Overseas Chinese 
Banking Group of 
Singapore 
S t r a i t s Trading 
Company 
S t r a i t s Trading Company Butterworth, Malays ia 60 000 .. 16.3 JT "" d7 ' 
' t . ; • - -
3. Royal Dutch Shei: B i l l i t o n Maatschappy Thai land Smelting and 
Re f in ing Company (Tha i 
s a rco ) 
Phuket, Thai land 40 000 10«8£/ 16.6 100.0 8 , 3 
; 1 -
4. Government o f 
the Sov ie t 
Union 
Same Same Novos ib i r sk , Podo lsk , 
P j tkya ranté E Ge-
khaya, Sov i e t 
Union 
39 000 10.5 15.0 100.0 : 6 . 6 
Ï J: 
5. Government o f PR 
China 
Same Yunan Tin Corporation^/ 
Pingkwei Mining 
Assoc iat ion c/ 














6 . Government o f 
Indonesia 
P . T . Timah Pelt im Muntok, Bangka 
I s l a n d , Indones ia 
25 OOOg/ 6 .8 100=0 ; 4 .8 -
7 . Government o f 
B o l i v i a 




a/ Information on ownership o f companies, most o f i t r e f l e c t i n g the l a t e s t developments, up to 1977, a re from: Wa l te r Sk inner , Mining I n t e rna t i ona l Yearbook, 1977 
ed i t ion . Trevor Ta r r i ng , é d . , Non Ferrous Metal V.'orks o f the World, 1974 ? London, Metal B u l l e t i n Books. United S t a t e s Bureau o f Minés Pub l i c a t i on s (.see notes 5 and 6 
above ) . In te rna t iona l Tin Council ( s e e note 1 above)7~b7 Capac i t i e s o f t i n smelters a re f o r 1974, taken from: In te rna t i ona l Tin Counc i l , 1976, Trade_ in T i ru_ I964-a974, 
London. Tota l r o r l d capacity i s estimated a t 368 400 metric t ons , c/ From: Vor ld Metal S t a t i s t i c s ; - May -1977. d/ M a l a y s i a ' s t i n metal p roduct ion - a t the two sme l te r s , 
Datufc Keramat and S t r a i t s Traçlipg Company, vas 83 100 tons i n 1975~br 36.6$ o f the w o r l d ' s t o t a l . Breakdown by smelters i s not a v a i l a b l e , e/ Product ion f i g u r e f o r 
Braz i l from Walter Skinner , Mining In t e rna t i ona l Yearbopjc, 1975 e d i t i o n , f / T h a i l a n d ' s capac i ty i s taken from United S ta t e s Bureau o f Mines, Minera l Facts_.and 
Problems, 1975, Chapter on t i n . z/ Indones i a ' s capacity i s taken from Metal B u l l e t i n , 28 November 1975. h/ In 1978, an expansion t o 20 000 tons . 
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•Table 7 
ANNUAL WESTERN WORLD PRIMARY TIN CONSUMPTION AND STOCK SALES ( + ) OR PURCHASES ( - ) BY THE 
• INTERNATIONAL TIN COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION 
' (Thot'sands o f metric tons ) 
Total 
Year ITC Consumption GSA GSA stock 
(end o f year ) 
1956 0.0 153.7 - 19 .5 347.0 
19^7 -15 .5 150.4 - 4 . 0 351.0 
1958 -8o2 143.1 0.0 351.0 
1959' 13.5 149.9 - 1 . 8 352.8' 
I960 0.0 - 159.7 ' - 5 . 2 357.8 
1961 10.2 158.8 2.8 355.1 
1962. - 3 . 3 163.3 2.2 ... 352.9 
1965 3.3 166.9 10.0 . 3 4 2 . 8 
1964 0.0 172.3 29.1 313.7 
1965 0.0 171.5 24.4 289.3 
1966 0.0 172.7 16.4 
7.4 
272.9 
1967 - 4 . 8 172.2 265.5 
1968 - 6 . 6 175=5 3.6 261.9 
1969 6 .8 183.5 1.7 260.2 
1970 3.5 183.4 3.5 256.7 ' 
1971 - 5 . 4 185.7 lo8 254.9 
1972 - 5 . 8 ' 186.4 0 .2 254.7 
1973 11.5 202.4 19.6 255.1 
1974 o o o O O O 27.7 207.4 
Source: Gordon Wo Smith and George R. Schink, "The International Tin Agreements A Reassement", 
Economic Journal , December, 1976, based on Meta l lgese l l schaf t A .G . , Metal S t a t i s t i c s ; 
International Tin Council ; GSA; Bureau of Mines, "Mineral Industry Surveys: T in " . 
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Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: PRODUCTION Of! TIN BY COUNTRIES, 1950-1977 
(Thousands o f tons, percentage of regional to ta l and acumul'ated average annual ra tes of growth) 
Argentina Bo l iv i a B ras i l 
. • L a t i n -
America 
1950 0 . 3 " 31=7 ' 0=1 '33.1" 
Par t ic ipat ion in percentage 0 . 9 95=8 0 .3 100.0 
I960 0.1 19=7 1=3 22.1 
Par t ic ipat ion in percentage 0 .5 . 89=1 • 5=9 100=0 
Growth r a te , 1950-1960 -10 .4 ; - 4 . 6 29=2 - 4 . 0 . 
1970 1 .2 30.1 4.3 36 .4 ' 
Pa r t i c ipa t ion in percentage 3 .3 82.7 11.8 100.Ò ' 
Growth ra te , 1960-1970 28.2 4 .3 12.7 5.1 
1975 0 .5 32.0 5.0 38.5 
Par t ic ipat ion 1 .3 83.1 13.0 100.0 
Growth ra tes : 1970-1975 -11 .8 1.1 5=8 1.4 
1950-1975 1=9 0.1 16.7 0.7 
1977 0 = 5 32.6 6 .4 40.0,. 
Par t ic ipat ion in percentage 1.2 81=5 16.1 100.01 
Source: Metal S t a t i s t i c s , 1959-1960, 1957-1966, 1965-1975, Meta l l gese l l s cha f t , A .G. , Frankfurt am Main. 
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Table 9 
MAIN INDICATORS OF THE ROLE OF TIN INDUSTRY IN BOLIVIAN ECONOMY 
1970 1975 1978 
Exports of tin 
a) Concentrates thousands of tons .„27.8 17.4 13. B/, 
U..JS.0 millions 107. 0 120.0 172. T 
b) Metal thousands of tons 7.5 15.9 
U. S. ?D millions 51.4 201.0 
c) Unit value U. S. S ..... , . . . 3.845 - 6.891 12. 498 
d) Quoted official 
price U. S. S/lb, 1.68 3. 11 5.72 
Indexes (1970=100) 
a) Vblume of tin exports i 100 90 107 
b) Value of tin exports lo 100 160 349 
c) Unit value % 100 179 327 
Jin in_ĉ strx_sjTares of 
a) Total exports % 45 29 52 
b) Public budget current 
incomes a/ 16 8 18 
c) GNP b/ 6 7 5 
d) Employment » 3.5 it 
Sources; "Boletín Estadístico", N° 232, Banco Central de Bolivia, 
December 1978 and "Bolivia", Separata of Economic Survey of 
Latin America, 1978, CEPAL, 1979. 
a/ Mining royalties, 
b/ Mining (excluding oil). 
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Tablé 10• 
C0MIB0L PROFITS AND LOSS ACCOUNT, 1965-1975 
• (Thousands o f d o l l a r s ) 
— 1965 " ' " 1970"' ' 1974' 1975a/ 
Income 80 287 99 713 128 018 • 238 4g4, , , , . 198 773 
Sa le o f minerals 78 569 97 458 127 289 237 380 197 792 
Expenditures 76 170 90 665 124 056 •! . . 222,'ï$8. .•'./. • ' ' 194 023 
Operating p r o f i t or l o s s „ ,4 117 9 048 3 962 "• 16 226 ; 4 750 
Less s . 1 995 3 998 2 976 7 374 3 637 
Worker p r o f i t sharing 1 599 3 796 2 372 6 454 2 827 
Income tax b/ •396 .,c ¿02 ' . 604 " 9 2 0 810 
Net p r o f i t o r l o s s 2 122 5 050 "' 1 986 8 852 1 113 
Sources COMIBOLf IMF; Mission estimates. Quoted in IBRD, Report N2 1251&-BO, o p . c j t . . 
a/ Estimated. 
b/ Paid 'on behal f of employees. 
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MINING TAXATION, 1965-1974 : 

















Sources In s t i tu t e f o r International Development, Harvard Univers i ty . 















BOLIVIA: SALES OF TIN CONCENTRATES TO DIFFERENT SMELTERS 
AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS, 1975 
( in percentage of tti .t .alsales) 
Importing company Parent company or owners Percentage 
31.4 
24.7 
i s 23o6 • 
7.6 
4.3 
Gulf Resources and Chemical and 
Metal lurg ica l Corporation, Long 
Horn,-United States 
ENAF Vinto, Bo l i v i a 
Capper Pass & Son, L td . Yorkshire, 
United Kingdom 
MENSA (Metalúrgica del Noroeste ) , 
V i l l a ga r c í a de Arosa, Spain 
CESBRA (Cocipanhia Estañ í fe ra do 
B r a z i l ) , Volta Redonda, B raz i l 
Berzel ius Metalhiitten Gese l l sha f t , 
Duisburg, V.'anheim, Western Germany 
Gulf Resources and Chemical 
'Corporation Ke l log , Idaho, 
United States 
State Enterprise of Bo l iv i a 
Río Tinto Zinc Corporation, 
London, United Kingdom 
MENSA,-Madrid, Spain 
Patino, NV., Netherlands 
Meta l l gese l l scha f t , A.G. 
Frankfurt , Western Germany 
5.1 
Raznoimport, Moscow, Soviet Union State Enterprise o f Soviet Union 2.9 
Sources: COMIBOL, Departamento de Venta de Minerales, La Paz, Bolivia . 
Trevor Tarring, Non .Ferrous Metal Works of the Vio r id , 1974, 2nd,.gditiori, Metal 
Bulletin Books, London. " 
Table l ì 
OUTPUT OF BOLIVIAN TIN-IN-CONCENTRATES AND THE QUANTITIES SMELTED BY VARIOUS COMPANIES, 1960-1975 
- (Tonnes) — 
Year 
Bol iv ian 

















l i u s 
.Spain Braz i l 
Soviet 
Union 
I960 20 543 - 1 IÒ3' 10 757 5 792 - 119 812 * - -
1961 21 333 - 2 081 10 078 5 426 - 266 ' 958 - -
1962 22 150 - 2 055 10 606 5 711, - 945 1: 216 - -
1963 22 603 - 2 666 9 591 5 165 - 1 517 1 020 - - -
1964 24 982 - 3 6 6 9 ' 8 735 4 703 - 5 230 920 - - -
1965 24 164 - 3 470 8 410- 4 529 - 4 356 953 - -
1966 25 932 - 1 100 11 103 5 979, 4-417 . , 895 , ; - -
1967 28 166 - 1 076 13 637 7 343 - 3 299 1 279 - - -
1968 29 568 - 60 14 260 7 024 - 2 836 963 - - -
1969 30 Ò47 - 86 18 635 5 566 907 - - -
1970 30 100 - 200 12 599 6 490 4 741 - 1 178 - - -
1971 30 290 6 820 - 9 871 4 862 3 059 - 1 253 - - 1 933 
1972 32 405 6 528 - 7 680 5 562 4 283 - 1 125 117 - 162 
1973 28 568 7 038 - 4 002 7 115 4 536 - 1 758 230 1 141 2 916 
1974 29 151 7 042 - - 7 490 5 970 - 1 479 1 430 - 1 355 
1975 28 324 7 500 - _ 7 750 6 415 1 822 865 - _ 
Source: ITC s t a t i s t i c s and estimates of Economist Inte l l i gence Unito 
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Table 14 
BOLIVIA? EXPANSION OF TIN SMELTING, 1960-1978 
(Thousands o f tons o f t in metal content and percentage of smelting) 
Volume 
Concentrates Smelted. - . . . -Total 
Percentage 
smelted. 
I960 18.6 ... l . « l 19.7 5.6 
1970 " " " 29.4' ' 0.7 ' 30.1 2.3 
1975 24.4 .. 7c6 .••;/. • . ! ,•• 32 .0 ' ' 23.8 
1977 19.3 13.3 32.6 40.8 
1978a/ 13.8 15.9 29.7 53.5 
Sources» Metal S t a t i s t i c s , 1950-1959, 1957-1966, 1965-1975, Meta l l gese l l scha f t A .G . , Frankfurt, am. 
Maim and Bolet ín Estad ís t ico , Nö "232, Banco Central de B o l i v i a , December, 1978. 
a/ Exports. ' ' 
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Table 15. 
INVESTMENT AND OPERATING COSTS IN VINTO TIN SMELTER IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1970 
- * Stage 1 Stage 2 " " Stage 3 
(1974) (1976) ( f i n a l ) 
A» Expansion of smelter ' s capacity 
Fixed investment (thousand of d o l l a r s ) 13 000 5 500 23 ,500 
Working cap i ta l (thousand o f d o l l a r s ) 7 000 2 600 11 200 
Production (thousand o f tons ) 7 100 11 000 20 000 
Total employment 620 640 880 
Bo Operating costs (thousand of d o l l a r s ) 
Mater ia ls 
Miscellaneous ( f l u x , ac ids , e t c » ) 100 o.o . . . 
Fuel o i l 685 o>. 1»¿o 
E l e c t r i c i t y 144 ooo o o 
Charcoal 403 ooo ooo 
Total materia ls 1 332 2 040 3 700 
Direct costs 
Labour including overhead 1 860 1 910 2 640 
Maintenance of f i xed c ap i t a l ) 390 550 1 260 
Total d i r ec t costs 3 582 4 500 7 600 
Costs 
Depreciation " 1 300 1 850 4 200 
Interest on investment (850 " 1 600 2 260 5 040' 
Transportation, marketing and 
insurance 1 090 1 700 3 100 
Total costs 7 472 10 310 19 940 
Contract incomes a/ 3 672 7 960 21 090 
Probable operating p r o f i t ( l o s s ) ( 3 800) ( 2 350) ( l 150) 
Sources Estimates on base of ENAF data and above quoted IBRD, report N2 1, 251a-B0« 
a/ The estimation of contract incomes costs f o r smelting and r e f in ing are based on the Texas City and 
European smelter costso 
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Table 16 
BOLIVIA: EXPORTS OF TIN BY COUNTRIES OF DESTINY 
(Thousands of tons of metal content and percentage o f t o t a l exports ) 
Country 1974 .. . . Percentage 1975 Percentage 
1 . United Kingdom 7 681 27 
• 6 - 7 8 1 
• • £7, ^ 
2o United States 7 418 26 5 915 24 
3. Federal Republic of 
Germany 2 884 10 1 862 • 7 
4. B raz i l 2 349 8 f 1.184 ; 5. 
5» Soviet Union 1 859 6 1 970 8 
6» Argentina 1 228 4 929 • .4 
7° Checoslovakia 898 3 1 200 •"„ 'i • 
8» Netherlands 519 2 1 S32 ; ; ••; _ 7 
9« Colombia 356 1 108 0.6 
10» Japan 305 1 60 : " ' 0 .4 
11o Others 3 457 r 12 3 074 " 1 2 ' 
Total 28 954 100 24 915 100 
• 
Sources Memoria Anual del Banco Central de Bo l i v i a , Gestion 1976. 
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